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Exiting Litigation
Jay Tidmarsh*
The American judicial system will face significant challenges in the
twenty-first century. One of its immediate challenges is adapting the
rules of civil procedure to the stresses under which the civil-justice
system operates. Some of the most notable pressures arise from
transnational litigation, mass litigation, proliferation of claims against
governmental and corporate institutions, and competition from methods
of alternative dispute resolution that promise to dispense cheaper, faster,
and more satisfying justice.
One of the consequences of the pressure from alternative dispute
resolution has been the rise of a panoply of procedural forms for
resolving legal disputes. Despite its allure, a simple and uniform
procedural form remains unattainable. Therefore, critical issues facing
the present procedural system are the degree of divergence in procedural
forms that it should tolerate and the criteria by which 1it should consign
different types of claims to different procedural forms.
My point of departure for this inquiry is the well-known history of
the common law and equity. As the story is usually told in short form
(for the actual history is more complex), the limitations of common-law
procedure led to the rise of the system of equity.2 Equity's flexibility
and relative uniformity in matters of procedure, coupled with its
commitment to resolving cases on their merits, partially remedied the
rigidity, technicality, and multiplicity of procedural forms that became
Equity too
the hallmarks of the common law's writ system. 3
succumbed to the rigidity that plagued common-law procedure, so
reformers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries proposed a
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. See Jay Tidmarsh, UnattainableJustice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of
Adjudication, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1808-11 (1992).
2. For classic treatments of the common law and its relationship to equity, see F.W.
MAITLAND, EQUITY-ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (A.H. Chaytor & W.J.
Whittaker eds., 1929); FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898).
3. See THEODORE F. T. PLUNCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 680-81
(5th ed. 1956).
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complete procedural overhaul. 4 Many argued for the merger of the
systems of law and equity into a single procedural form governed by a
uniform set of rules. 5 This merger borrowed some of the perceived best
features from the common law-such as the single culminating trial of
the jury system-but it relied far more heavily on the spirit of ancient
equity. 6 Thus, the merged system, whose classic instantiation is the
to be flexible,
1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was designed
7
non-technical, simple, uniform, and merits-oriented.
As it has developed over the past seventy-plus years, the Federal
Rules approach has proven to have its own problems. Principal
criticisms include expense, delay, inefficiency, difficulty in resolving
mass litigation, and obfuscatory adversarial practices. 8 Some of these
perceived problems have resulted in corrective amendments to the
Federal Rules. 9 At the same time, alternatives to the litigation systemsuch as arbitration, mediation, and settlement-have become popular. 10
Alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") methods rarely adopt the
procedural rules that govern litigation in court; rather, each ADR

4. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 1.7-.8 (5th ed. 2001); Jay Tidmarsh,
Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 520-29 (2006).
5. England abolished the distinction between law and equity in the 1870s. Supreme Court of
Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 3 (Eng.) (uniting the common-law courts and equity
under one Supreme Court); Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77, §§ 16On the
17 (Eng.) (establishing a single set of procedural rules in English courts).
recommendation of leading scholars such as Roscoe Pound and Charles Clark, see Roscoe Pound,
Some Principles of ProceduralReform, 4 ILL. L. REV. 491, 498-501 (1910); Charles E. Clark &
James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 415-35 (1935), most
American courts did the same. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 2 (creating a single type of claim, a
"civil action").
6. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil
Procedure in HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 922-26 (1987); Charles E. Clark,
The Handmaidof Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297 (1938).
7. For one treatment of the basic assumptions underlying the modem American procedural
system, see SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ESSENTIALS (2007).
8. See THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 30-31, 171-87
(A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979); Subrin, supra note 6, at 974; John H. Langbein,
The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 830-55 (1985).
9. The principal reforms have occurred in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 16, and 26.
For a brief discussion of these amendments up through 2006, see Tidmarsh, supra note 4, at 536
& n.106, 585-86 & nn.294-96. The subsequent electronic-discovery amendments to Rules 26(b)
and 45 demonstrate the ongoing accommodation between the Federal Rules' commitment to
broad discovery and the rise of technologies unimagined when the Rules were adopted in 1938.
Id.
10. See Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 165-66 (2003);
Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1851 (2000)
[hereinafter Developments].
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method has procedures peculiar to its form.1 Given this reality, an
evident question is whether, as we had once merged the procedural
systems of law and equity, we should now merge the best features of
litigation procedure with the best features of ADR procedure.
I asked exactly this question (although I did not try to answer it) in an
article that I published three years ago. At the time, I thought that I had
coined a clever12 phrase to capture the issue by referring to ADR as the
"new equity."' But it turns out that, at almost exactly the same time,
13
Thomas Main published an article entitled ADR: The New Equity.
Professor Main and I might argue over bragging rights to the phrase,
except that the idea has been around for a long time. In 1938, when the
ink on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was still fresh, Charles
Clark, the Rules' principal drafter, took note of the rise of
administrative agencies' use of adjudication. 14 Dean Clark analogized
the then-nascent phenomenon of administrative adjudication to the
equity of old, and suggested that the "benefits of experience" with
administrative adjudication might eventually suggest reforms for the
15
Federal Rules.
Dean Clark's article makes a significant point: ADR and litigation are
not the only government-backed procedural regimes. 16 Adjudication in
administrative agencies is a third process. A final dispute-resolution
process involves ad hoc claims-resolution facilities or programs used in
mass litigation. 17 In her important article, Judith Resnik points out that
resort to these various dispute-resolution processes is often dictated by

11. For a review of the basic forms of ADR, see LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E.
WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 2-6 (abr. 2d ed. 1998); Hensler, supra note
10, at 165-66.
12. See Tidmarsh, supra note 4, at 577.
13. Thomas 0. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329 (2005). (Professor
Main's article came out in Winter 2005; my article came out in January 2006).
14. Clark, supra note 6, at 301-03.
15. Id. at 303. Dean Clark also recommended that administrative procedure be amended in
light of experience with the new Federal Rules. Id.
16. The adjective "government-backed" is important. In ADR, the ultimate decision-maker is
almost never a judge; either the parties themselves or a non-judicial neutral such as an arbitrator
make the decision about how the dispute should resolve itself. Nonetheless, ADR can be
"government-backed" in the sense that courts will: (1) encourage or require parties to use ADR
methods during the course of litigation, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (2006); (2) enforce contractual
agreements to enter into ADR, see 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006); and (3) enforce awards or decisions made
in ADR, see id. §§ 9-10. But see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375,
380-82 (1994) (holding that, unless they reserve jurisdiction, federal courts do not have ancillary
jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements).
17. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.

266
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the parties' contractual agreement. 18 She then argues that judges who
enforce these agreements have imported-but also should do more to
import-some of the basic due process protections applicable in
litigation into contract-based dispute resolution. 19 As she states, the
judiciary in this century must decide when to allow parties to contract
out of the litigation system, and whether to make the procedures by
20
which contracted-out dispute resolution occurs more uniform.
Although my point of departure is different from that of Professor
Resnik, her inquiry mirrors my own. Contrary to the sanguinity of my
earlier article, my present view is that a merger of procedural forms will
not be an easy, or necessarily advisable, matter for the foreseeable
future. A principal reason is the lack of a single equity-like procedural
form with which to merge litigation procedure. Rather, there are three
distinct "equities": first, disputes in which putative litigants themselves
adopt a different procedural form; second, disputes in which putative
litigants have a different procedural form adopted for them by a
representative; and third, disputes in which the applicable statute
requires an alternative procedural form. Loosely, these "equities"
translate into traditional ADR, mass litigation, and administrative
adjudication. Because these three "equities" present distinct procedural
forms and needs, melding all three with the litigation process into a
single procedural form seems an unlikely occurrence.
Rather, our efforts should be directed toward specifying the grounds
on which courts should allow parties to exit from standard litigation
procedure into another procedural form. I begin from a simple premise:
a liberal democracy that maintains a court system promises to provide
litigants in that system a reasonably adequate level of process. 2 1 Given
that promise, a democracy's decision to allow putative litigants to exit
from its adjudicatory system is problematic on equality grounds-at
least when non-litigation processes are likely to result in differential
22
(and worse) outcomes for some putative litigants.

18.

Judith Resnik, Procedureas Contract,80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 622-23 (2005).

19. Id. at 665-68.
20. Id. at 668.
21. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... ); id. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ")
22. It is well-known that different litigation procedures can affect the likelihood and amount
of a party's recovery or liability. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. The use of
different procedures in non-adjudicatory processes can have the same effect. See infra notes 30,
38-39 and accompanying text.
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In this essay, I argue that courts can legitimately allow exit on only
three grounds. The first is the consent of the putative litigant(s) whose
positions are made worse by exit. The second ground arises when exit
is not worse for any putative litigant. Third, even when exit is worse for
one or more putative litigants, the overall savings from exit into a nonlitigation process exceed the losses incurred by those parties in the nonlitigation process. 2 3 These three grounds roughly correspond to the
three circumstances in which exit usually occurs: respectively, ADR,
mass litigation, and administrative adjudication. 24 Policy-makers and
judges should pay closer attention than they traditionally have to
whether one or more of these grounds is present before allowing
litigants to exit into a procedural form that competes with the litigation
system. These grounds also suggest a framework for considering other
issues of pressing concern to the American litigation system, including
the extent to which the lack of uniformity in procedural rules should be
tolerated.25
I. BEFORE EXIT OCCURS: EXPECTATIONS GENERATED BY A LITIGATION
SYSTEM

I begin with three simple propositions. First, if a modern liberal
democracy chooses to establish a judicial system, one function of that
system is to resolve the legal claims of the individuals who choose to
enter the system. Second, the procedural form(s) established by the
judicial system promise litigants a reasonably accurate resolution of
each claim at an acceptable pace and an acceptable price. This second
proposition contains, quite deliberately, a number of weasel words.
Perfect accuracy, instantaneous decisions, and costless process are, of
course, chimerical; nor is it necessary that, to fulfill its promise, a court
provide the best available procedures. 2 6 It is enough that a court uses a
set of procedures that, in the main, resolves disputes fairly well. A wide
array of procedural approaches-for instance, inquisitorial versus
adversarial, or jury-tried versus bench-tried-might satisfy this
requirement.
Third, the procedural choices by which a given court system gives
effect to its promise of a reasonably accurate resolution of each claim
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part IMI.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. If a court were required to provide the best possible procedures, then any procedural
system that provided anything less would be illegitimate. Proceduralists have not generally
imposed such a stringent requirement.
See Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of
Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1198 (2009).
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are not outcome-neutral. For instance, a rule permitting summary
27
judgment suppresses settlement values and favors defendants;
conversely, a rule permitting liberal joinder increases most plaintiffs'2 8
chances of success, although it tends to suppress plaintiffs' awards.
For present purposes, it is unimportant whether a pro-plaintiff or prodefendant orientation in any particular procedural rule, or in a
procedural system as a whole, is chosen. The critical fact is that a
chosen set of procedures is part of the calculus of a case's expected
29
outcome, and changes to that set of rules affect the expected outcome.
Put differently, procedural choices have substantive consequences.
Alternatives to litigation adopt procedures different from litigation;
indeed, it is precisely to avoid the seemingly less favorable procedures
established for litigation-and the less favorable substantive outcomes
that attend those procedures-that parties with sufficient bargaining
power often opt for non-litigation alternatives. 30 The extent of the
procedural differences depends on the alternative form chosen.
Settlements and mediation employ entirely distinct models of dispute
resolution, while arbitration and administrative adjudication hew closer
to the litigation model. 3 1 Regardless of the precise set of procedures
selected, different procedural rules can alter the parties' expected
outcomes in relation to the outcomes that they might have expected
under the litigation system.

27. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 89 (1990).
28. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Consolidationof Plaintiffs: The Effects
of Number of Plaintiffs on Jurors' Liability Decisions, Damage Awards, and Cognitive
Processing of Evidence, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 909, 914, 917 (2000); Irwin A. Horowitz &
Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Outlier Presence, PlaintiffPopulation Size, and Aggregation
of Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury Decisions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209, 225-26 (1988).
29. Assuming the parties' risk neutrality, the expected outcome of a case for a plaintiff can be
determined by the equation P x L - Cp and the expected outcome for the defendant can be
determined by the equation (I - P) x L - Cd, where P is the probability of the plaintiff's victory, L
is the amount of the plaintiffs recovery in the event of victory, C. is the cost of litigation that the
plaintiff bears, and Cd is the cost of litigation that the defendant bears. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 21.1-.2 (7th ed. 2007); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 135-36 (3d ed. 2003). Cv and Cd are composed of two
variables, the direct cost of litigation (such as attorneys' fees and expert-witness expenses) and
the cost of erroneous decisions. POSNER, supra, §§ 21.1-2. Therefore, changes in procedural
rules that affect either a party's cost of litigating the case or the accuracy of the judgment alter the
expected outcome (unless the effect on the two costs is a washout).
30. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preferencefor Binding Arbitration,74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 680-86 (1996).
3 1. For basic descriptions of the procedures used in different forms of dispute resolution, see
sources cited supra note 11.
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None of this is especially controversial. I am not claiming that the
procedural rules that courts establish are necessarily better than
alternative procedural forms, or that alternative forms are necessarily
suspect. On the contrary, as with any set of broad rules, the rules of the
litigation system are not optimal for some cases, and using these rules
might be too expensive or might lead to errors that procedures more
closely tailored to the needs of these cases can avoid. In some
situations, it undoubtedly benefits both parties to exit from litigation. In
other situations and for other parties, however, non-litigation procedures
lead to less favorable outcomes than the outcomes that those parties
32
could have achieved through litigation.
In economic terms, exiting from litigation into non-litigation
procedures can constitute a Pareto improvement: in other words, exit
can work to the advantage of all parties and the court by making at least
one participant better off and none worse off.3 3 Such an exit increases
efficiency without damaging any person's expectations. When exit
from litigation leaves one or more parties, or the court, in a worse
position, however, courts cannot explain the exit on Pareto grounds, but
must find another justification.
This last statement requires brief explanation. It derives from the
simple ethical proposition that, at a minimum, people and governments
should "do no harm."
As a complete statement of ethics, the
proposition is inadequate: on the one hand, people might owe
affirmative obligations beyond not harming others, and on the other,
even good and necessary actions can harm others. But in a democracy
committed to maximizing the liberty to act, the "do no harm" principle
acts as a starting point for determining the legitimate scope of
governmental action. 34 Captured by the aphorism that my right to
swing my fist ends at your nose, 35 the principle requires that good
32. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626-27 (1996) (describing a
class-action settlement in which some class members received no compensation for their claims,
and future claimants received awards that were, due to a lack of protection from inflation,
effectively less than those given to present claimants); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317
F.3d 646, 669 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding an arbitration procedure unenforceable when it provided a
significant disincentive for plaintiffs to pursue their claims).
33. For a qualification to this statement, see infra note 52 and accompanying text. For general
discussions of Pareto efficiency, see POSNER, supra note 29, § 1.2, at 12-13; THOMAS J. MICELI,
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 4-6 (2004); POLINSKY, supra note 29, at 8-9.
34. See William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes among Group
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1644-50 (1997); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 756 (1989).
35. The saying is sometimes used as a shorthand description of John Stuart Mill's argument
for liberty. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 142 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed. 1985) (1859)
(stating that if "a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself ... there
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reasons support any harm an individual or the government proposes to
cause to another individual's liberty or economic interests.
Put differently, by recognizing and then opening its doors to the
vindication of certain claims through its court system, the government
creates something of value. Along with the substantive rules, the
court's procedural rules establish that value. Thus, a set of litigation
rules helps to create a certain level of expected entitlement in putative
litigants. 36 This entitlement is not "strong," in the sense that a court is
powerless to change its procedural rules without violating the rights of
parties. 37 Nonetheless, because using different procedural rules can
change a claim's value, a court's willingness to allow parties to exit into
processes that use different rules to resolve their dispute requires
justification.
Take, for example, a person with a $100,000 claim. Assuming that
using litigation procedures leads to a 50% chance of recovery on the
claim and the expected litigation expenses are $20,000, then the claim
has an expected value of $30,000 in the litigation system. Permitting
exit into an arbitration system can alter this value. Assuming that
arbitration uses procedures that reduce the putative plaintiffs chance of
success to 40%,38 and the putative plaintiffs expenses in arbitration are

should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action"); id. at 141 ("As soon as any part of
a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it.").
36. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
37. Some aspects of these rules, however, might be strong enough to lie beyond a court's
capacity to alter. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950) ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is
to be afforded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.").
38. Such a reduction in the likelihood of recovery is possible for a number of reasons. One is
that the arbitration process uses truncated discovery, which denies the plaintiff the opportunity to
obtain information that might increase the chance of recovery. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(6)(B)
(extending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to arbitration proceedings "to the extent
applicable"); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1990) ("Although those
procedures might not be as extensive as in the federal courts, by agreeing to arbitrate, a party
'trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality,
and expedition of arbitration."' (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))); Penn v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753, 756
(7th Cir. 2001) (noting limitations on discovery in arbitration). Another is that the arbitrators
themselves consistently tend to favor the interests of one party. Cf 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2006)
(permitting a court to set aside an arbitration award only when there exists "evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators"); Winfrey v. Simmons Foods Inc., 495 F.3d 549, 551 (8th Cir. 2007)
("Where an agreement entitles the parties to select interested arbitrators, 'evident partiality'
cannot serve as a basis for vacating an award under § 10(a)(2) absent a showing of prejudice.");
Penn, 263 F.3d at 756 (refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement that used an arbitrator with an
incentive to "tilt the scales" in favor of one party).
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$12,000, then the expected value of the claim falls to $28,000-a net
loss of $2,000 to the putative plaintiff.3 9 Before a court allows exit into
arbitration, it should be required to justify why it has allowed a $2,000
harm to befall a person to whom it has putatively held open its doors.
II.

WHEN EXIT MIGHT OCCUR: THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ALTERING THE
PARTIES' LITIGATION EXPECTATIONS

Assuming that a court's raw exercise of political power favoring
powerful interests is an insufficient justification for causing harm to less
powerful litigants, 40 a court can readily invoke two grounds to justify its
willingness to acquiesce in a putative litigant's decision to exit from
litigation. One is the autonomy of individuals to make their own
decisions, even decisions that harm their interests. 4 1 The other is an
increase in social utility that results from exit-in other words, any
losses to some individuals are offset by greater gains to others. 4 2 The
social-utility rationale divides into two scenarios: situations in which no
individual suffers a loss but at least one person enjoys a gain (Pareto
improvements), and situations in which the losses to one or more
individuals are smaller than the gains to others (non-Pareto gains in
43
social utility).

39. I have created an example in which a plaintiff is the person whose litigative expectations
are harmed. It is easy to construct other examples in which a defendant's expectations are
harmed.
40. Admittedly, this assumption can be made only with some difficulty. Legal realists and
critical legal scholars argue that the interests and preferences of political elites shape or determine
the results in adjudication. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 731 (2009) (arguing that the skepticism of legal realists exposed the political and moral
influences affecting judicial decisionmaking, but that legal realists also believed that the rule of
law controlled these influences to some degree); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The CriticalLegal
Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV. 561 (1983) (arguing that political interests shape the law).
But the aspiration of adjudication, however imperfectly realized, is impartial and equal treatment
of all who come before a court. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259
(2009) ("It is axiomatic that '[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.'
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955))); id. at 2263 (noting that "fairness and
disinterest and neutrality are among the factors at work" in rendering judicial decisions).
41. The classic liberal argument for autonomy is that of John Stuart Mill. See MILL, supra
note 35; see also Rubenstein, supra note 34 (discussing the circumstances in which this autonomy
must give way when a party's litigative position threatens to harm the interests of similarly
situated litigants).
42. For modem arguments that the legal system should adopt a utilitarian approach, see Louis
KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002); Richard A. Posner,
Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
43. The third justification accepts the definition of Pareto efficiency from the second
justification, but with one important modification: it does not require that those who gain from an
action provide a portion of their gains to the losers in order to make the losers indifferent to the
action. Such compensation would be necessary to satisfy the condition of Pareto efficiency. This
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Obviously, the three justifications (consent, Pareto improvements,
and net-utility gains) are in philosophical tension.
The first is
libertarian; the last two are utilitarian. The first is deontological; the last
two are consequentialist.
Moreover, because they state different
conditions for allocative efficiency, the Pareto and net-utility
justifications are distinct from each other. 44 Moreover, the Pareto
justification requires that the procedures used in an alternative process
are cheaper for at least one party, while the net-utility justification can
apply when an alternative process is either cheaper or leads to greater
45
accuracy in the decision.
For present purposes, however, it is unnecessary to determine which
principle is "correct." The justifications often overlap in their practical
import. For example, a common reason why a person exits from
litigation is consent, and the most likely reason for parties to give
consent is that the expected non-litigated result is more advantageous
than the expected result from litigation. 4 6 Conversely, people will not
usually consent to exit when they perceive the expected non-litigated
result to be less advantageous than the litigated result. As a pragmatic
47
matter, choosing between justifications in such cases is unnecessary.

modification, known as the Kaldor-Hicks refinement, is commonly made in modern economic
theory. See MICELI, supra note 33, at 4-6; POSNER, supra note 29, § 1.2, at 13.
44.See supra note 43.
45. As described before, two variables determine the costliness of procedure: the error rate
and the direct costs of litigation. See supra note 29. The error rate is the cost imposed by
inaccurate decisions. Many of these costs are borne by other actors in society, who might be
unwilling to engage in risky but socially beneficial actions if they believe that the legal system
will erroneously judge their actions to be unlawful. POSNER, supra note 29, § 21.1. But the error
rate also affects a plaintiff's probability of recovery. If we assume that a plaintiff in a perfect
world has a 50% chance of recovering on a $100,000 claim, but the procedures are systematically
biased in such a way as to cause a 5% error rate in defendants' favor, the plaintiffs actual chance
of recovery is 45%; the claim is thus worth $45,000. If an alternative process reduces that error
rate to 0%, then the value of the plaintiffs claim rises to $50,000. Because this $5,000 increase
in value comes at the expense of the defendant, such an alternative procedure-even though it
enhances accuracy-is not a Pareto improvement unless the alternative process also cuts the
defendant's direct litigation costs by at least $5,000. For this reason, Pareto improvements in
procedure always involve reductions in direct litigation costs. On the other hand, a procedure that
increases accuracy meets the condition for the net-utility justification even when it increases
direct litigation costs, as long as any additional direct litigation costs from the alternative process
are less than the savings from reduced error costs.
46. For examples of situations in which settlement is mutually advantageous to the parties, see
THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 174-75 (2d ed. 2008); POLINSKY, supra note
29, at 137-39.
47. In many cases, both justifications are likely to lead to the same conclusion. The
circumstances in which the choice of justification matters are: (1) when one or more parties
consent to use of a non-litigation process whose expected outcome is sufficiently less than the
expected outcome from litigation that the net social utility of the choice is negative; and (2) when
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Indeed, theories of consent and utility both operate in American law.
Doctrines that allow the voluntary and knowing relinquishment of a
legal entitlement are common in substantive fields. 4 8 So are doctrines
that seek to increase social utility. 49 Consent and utility also shape
procedural doctrines. 50 Regardless of which justification is ethically
superior-an issue that I cannot pretend to resolve in this essayputative litigants but satisfies neither principle
judicial action that harms
51
is difficult to defend.
Taken together, these justifications suggest three conditions that
courts should impose on parties' decisions to exit litigation. The first
condition is the harmed party's knowing and voluntary consent to exit.
The second condition involves an exit that puts no one-not the parties,
the court, or society as a whole 52 -in a worse position; in this case, an

one or more parties refuse to consent to a non-litigation process that increases net social utility.
In these situations, the two theories lead to different conclusions on the propriety of exit.
48. See, e.g., Shneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (permitting use of
evidence seized after a defendant consented to a search of his brother's car); Omri Ben-Shahar,
Essay, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for ContractualLiability, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 1829, 1829 (2004) ("One of the pillars of the law of contract formation is the principle of
mutual assent.").
49. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (determining
negligence by weighing the cost of safety precautions against the expected reduction in
accidents); POSNER, supra note 29 (providing an economic interpretation of tort, contract,
criminal, property, antitrust, corporate, taxation, and constitutional law).
50. For two Federal Rules that rely on the parties' consent, see FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)
(allowing consent to amendments to pleadings); FED. R. Civ. P. 29 (allowing parties to stipulate
to alter certain discovery procedures). For Federal Rules that specifically invoke concerns for
efficient resolution of the dispute, see FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (establishing a rule of construction that
the Federal Rules "be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action"); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(P) (giving courts case-management
powers to "facilitat[e] .. .the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action"); FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (permitting a court to limit discovery when "the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit").
51. Aside from autonomy and utilitarianism, there are numerous ethical theories on offer,
including altruism, egoism, Kant's categorical imperative, and virtue ethics. See Tidmarsh, supra
note 26, at 1142-44. With the possible exception of egoism, none of these theories supports the
imposition of harm on another without good cause. For example, the categorical imperative
requires that people be treated as ends, not means. See Hans Reiss, Introduction to KANT:
POLITICAL WRITINGS 1, 18 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991). Imposing costs on
other persons by forcing them to exit litigation merely to achieve greater personal advantage
would be impermissible from a Kantian perspective.
52. An argument can be made that, in some circumstances, the court system or society is
disadvantaged by exit decisions, even though the parties are better off because of exit. For the
classic argument about the possible social costs of allowing parties to settle out of court, see
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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5 3 The third condition
exit decision is usually a Pareto improvement.
54
requires that exit result in greater social utility.
Only one of these three conditions must exist in order for a court to
allow exit. It is not necessary that a court permit exit in each of these
circumstances: if a court is oriented toward the promotion of liberty, it
might permit exit only when consent is given despite the efficiency of
an alternative; and if a court is oriented toward efficiency, it need not
allow exit when the parties consent to an inefficient alternative to
adjudication. Moreover, a court might legitimately choose a middle
course, and apply one rationale in one situation and another in other
situations. At a minimum, however, a court should not permit parties to
exit its judicial process unless they meet one of these three conditions.
I recognize the difficulty involved in applying these three conditions
in practice. For the consent condition, the principal issue is precisely
how voluntary and informed the decision to exit must be. For instance,
must the putative plaintiff in my prior hypothetical 55 know that the
expected value of the claim in arbitration is $2,000 less in order for the
court to regard the consent to arbitration as effective? 56 Is the same
type of consent necessary when the parties agree before litigation to opt
for an ADR process, as opposed to when they agree to use ADR after
litigation has begun? What about form contracts? 57 For the efficiency-

53. As I have described, a Pareto improvement occurs when no person is made worse off and
at least one person is made better off. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. When exit into
a different procedural regime leaves everyone in the same position, no Pareto improvement has
occurred. But it is unlikely that many exit decisions will place every interested person in
precisely the same position as they would have been in without exit; hence, as a general matter,
when exit makes no one worse off, someone is made better off.
54. To be clear, the utility calculation must compare the error costs and direct costs of
litigation on one hand with the error costs and direct costs of the alternative procedure on the
other. See POSNER, supra note 29, §§ 21.1-.2 (describing the calculation and costs of error in
civil litigation). Included within the direct costs of the alternative procedure is the social cost of
uncertainty in legal rules, a cost that results from fewer litigated cases. See Fiss, supra note 52, at
1085-87; Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Basset, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6-8
(2004). Exit into a non-litigation alternative is permissible under this third condition only when
the net costs from using the alternative to litigation are less than the net costs from litigating the
dispute.
55. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (describing the change in value of a
plaintiff's claim moving from litigation to arbitration).
56. If so, one question is why a rational plaintiff would ever consent to a process likely to
result in a worse outcome. One answer might be that the plaintiff is a risk taker; another is that
the plaintiff mistakenly assesses the likely outcome or the costs of arbitration.
57. Compare, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001) (holding that
the Federal Arbitration Act includes most employment contracts and thus allows employers to
enter into form arbitration contracts with employees), and Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113
P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a contractual agreement to waive the use of class
actions in arbitration can in some instances be enforced), with Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446
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based conditions, the principal issue is informational: without knowing
what the evidence will reveal or how difficult it will be to obtain it, a
court's effort to calculate expected outcomes and litigation costs is
fraught with the prospect of error.5 8 Courts are even more likely to lack
the
the experience with litigation alternatives to accurately calculate
59
processes.
those
for
costs
and
outcomes
expected
comparable
As significant as they are, these practical concerns are surmountable.
With mature 60 or common 61 litigation, data and experience can be
useful for calculating expected values. Moreover, in some cases, parties
do not make exit decisions until the evidence has been discovered and
the majority of litigation expenses have been incurred.6 2 Finally,
through presumptions, burdens of proof, and rules of thumb, courts can
address remaining uncertainties. 63 My preference is to impose the
burden of proving the existence of an available justification on those
who seek to exit from the litigation system; otherwise, harmful exit
without adequate justification becomes too easy. But my preference is
itself a rule of thumb, not an absolute requirement demanded by the
principles justifying exit.

F.3d 25, 29 (1 st Cir. 2006) (striking down prohibitions against treble damages, attorneys' fees,
and the use of class actions in a consumer contract requiring arbitration).
58. See POSNER, supra note 29, § 21.1, at 594 ("[I]t is rarely possible (or at least efforts are
rarely made) to quantify the terms."); Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal
But Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE
L.J. 889, 896 (2009).
59. This statement is not true for many settlement agreements, in which the amount of the
settlement is known and the costs of implementing the settlement are insignificant. But even
here, the judge still faces the problem of calculating the expected net outcome from litigation,
against which the settlement figure must be compared.
60. See Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821,
1843 (1995) (arguing that, with mass torts, cases can eventually reach a mature equilibrium in
which the chances of victory and recovery can be predicted with some level of confidence).
61. See JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND CORP., COSTS AND
COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION (1986) (estimating total costs in automobile-accident
cases and in non-automobile-accident cases); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND CORP., COSTS OF
ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1983) (estimating total costs in asbestos cases).
62. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 13.12 (2004) (noting that "the
parties may be unwilling or unable to settle until they have conducted some discovery").
63. See White v. Mayflower Transit, L.L.C., 543 F.3d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a
person seeking to set aside an arbitration award bears the burden of proof); cf Reynolds v.
Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 285 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting the difficulty of the precise
valuation of a class's expected recovery in litigation in comparison to settlement, but suggesting
ways to achieve at least a "ballpark valuation"). Compare Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432
(1953) (holding that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are unenforceable in the securities area
despite the "hospitable attitude of legislatures and courts toward arbitration"), with Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (overruling Wilko and
rejecting the "outmoded presumption of disfavoring arbitration proceedings").
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III. WHEN EXIT DOES OCCUR: MATCHING EXIT DECISIONS WITH THE
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXIT

Exit most commonly occurs in one of three situations: movement into
ADR,64 determination through mass claims-resolution facilities, 65 and
adjudication in administrative agencies. 66 The first and the third
situations present opposing paradigms. Movement into ADR typically
occurs because of the parties' voluntary consent to enter an alternative
process. 67 Conversely, statutes created in the democratic process but
not necessarily with the consent of the parties compel some putative
litigants to adjudicate their claims before administrative agencies. 6 8 In

64. The exact number of cases that exit from litigation into ADR is uncertain, but it likely
significantly exceeds the number decided through litigation procedures. For instance, according
to a somewhat dated study, the number of federal cases that end in a judgment (whether the
judgment results from a motion to dismiss, summary judgment, or decision after trial) is about
20%; 63% of cases were resolved through settlement, which is one ADR method; and others were
resolved through arbitration. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the
Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 163 (1986); see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases
Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40,
1387 (1994) (analyzing the factors likely to cause greater movement toward settlement since the
Kritzer study). To use another measure of the popularity of ADR, in a 2005 survey of forty-nine
of the ninety-four federal district courts, courts referred a minimum of 24,835 cases to some ADR
process. John Lande, How Much Justice Can We Afford?: Defining the Courts' Roles and
Deciding the Appropriate Number of Trials, Settlement Signals, and Other Elements Needed to
Administer Justice, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 213, 224 n.62 (2006). In comparison, between October
2004 and September 2005, federal courts tried 5294 civil cases. LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM,
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2005
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 194 tbl. C-7 (2005). Civil filings in federal court during this
same period were 253,273. Id. at 152 tbl. C.
65. Again, the exact number of cases that are resolved through mass processes is uncertain,
and is variable from year to year. Mass resolutions can dispose of anywhere from a few hundred
cases to hundreds of thousands of cases. For instance, five mass-tort settlements in the 1990s
resolved anywhere from about 6,500 to an estimated 130,000 or more cases apiece. See JAY
TIDMARSH, MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES 10 (1998). For other
examples, see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005) (approving
settlement of a class action involving 5,000,000 members); In re Combustion, Inc., 978 F. Supp.
673 (W.D. La. 1997) (establishing claims-resolution process under aegis of the court for 10,000
claimants).
66. Professor Resnik estimates that, in recent years, the four largest administrative agencies
have conducted approximately 750,000 adjudications each year. See Resnik, supra note 18, at
604. By way of comparison, approximately 264,000 civil cases have been filed, on average, over
the past five years. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 48 tbl. S-7 (2008).
67. If a court rule or statute compels entry into a binding ADR process, the analysis of the exit
slides into the opposing paradigm. But such compulsion is rare. See Developments, supra note
10, at 1857 & n.44; infra note 78.
68. For a description of one important administrative process-the four-step, mostly nonadversarial process used to handle Social Security claims-see Frank S. Bloch et al., Developing
a Full and Fair Evidentiary Record in a Nonadversary Setting: Two Proposalsfor Improving
Social Security Disability Adjudications,25 CARDOzO L. REV. 1 (2003).
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this regard, the two paradigms-voluntary agreement and majority
will-mirror the two basic forms of social ordering, other than
69
adjudication, by which societies legitimately make decisions.
The second situation-the mass handling of claims in claimsresolution facilities-presents a mixed picture.
Like consensual
agreements associated with ADR, most mass resolutions occur as a
result of negotiated agreements that establish the process under which
individual awards are made. 70 As with democratic decision-making,
individual claimants typically do not consent (at least in the ordinary
sense of that word) to the mass-resolution process. Instead, others who
represent the interests of individual claimants-typically class
71
representative(s) and class counsel-consent on the claimants' behalf.
Moreover, these facilities often involve scheduled compensation
72
benefits comparable to those provided by administrative agencies.
Individuals usually have an opportunity to oppose the process, 7 3 and in
some cases have the opportunity to exit from this process back into the
litigation system. 7 4 But a court can impose the process on objectors
even against their will, as long as the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and
75
adequate."
In theory, any of the three justifications for exit into a different
procedural form (consent, Pareto improvement, or net gains in social
69. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 357-65
(1978) (indicating that the two principal forms of social ordering are organization by common
aims (or government) and organization by reciprocity (or contract)).
70. For descriptions of some of these agreements and their resulting processes for determining
individual claims, see S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE STUDIES OF MASS TORT
LIMITED FUND CLASS ACTION SETLEMENTS & BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS (2000);
TIDMARSH, supra note 65; Symposium, Claims Resolution Facilitiesand the Mass Settlement of
Mass Torts, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. I (Autumn 1990); Francis E. McGovern, Toward a
FunctionalApproach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1986).
71. See John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAMEL. REV. 1419,
1443-50 (2003) (discussing class-action settlements).
72. See Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative Comments on Claims
Resolution Facilities, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 121-27 (Autumn 1990) (describing the
operation of various claims-resolution facilities); see also Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation:
Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010
(1997) (analogizing global mass-tort settlement mechanisms to those of administrative agencies);
Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield Revisited,
75 U. CHI. L. REv. 603 2008) (discussing interplay of class-action settlements and the positive
political theory of the modem administrative state).
73. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e)(5) (describing how an individual objects to settlement).
74. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e)(4) (noting the court's procedure to allow an individual to be
excluded from the class before settlement); TIDMARSH, supra note 65, at 53-54, 66 (describing
back-end opt-out provisions, under which some claimants dissatisfied with the award provided in
the mass-resolution process, could re-enter the litigation system).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
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utility) can apply to any of the three situations in which exit typically

occurs (ADR, mass resolutions, and administrative adjudication). For
example, movement into an ADR process might be justified by the
parties' consent, or by the net savings that it generates if the court
mandates use of the process over the objection of one or more parties.
In practice, however, a rough correspondence exists between consent
and ADR processes; between Pareto improvement and mass-resolution
processes; and between net gains in social utility and administrative
processes.
The first and third correspondences require only brief discussion.
The connection between consent and ADR is evident. Parties typically
agree to settle, mediate, arbitrate, or use another ADR process; indeed,

their consent to opt into such a process serves as the reason for courts'
enforcement of ADR agreements and awards. 76 Although courts can
strongly encourage parties who have entered the litigation system to
agree to resolve disputes through ADR,7 7 they cannot force the parties
to accept the outcome of such a process 7 8 -at least without showing
that either the mandatory use of binding ADR is a Pareto improvement
or the outcome results in greater social utility. Available data and other
considerations suggest that courts might often have difficulty making
either showing for binding ADR. 7 9 Therefore, in most instances, the

76. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 9-10 (2006) (with certain exceptions, requiring courts to enforce
arbitration agreements and awards); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375,
382 (1994) (stating that a settlement agreement is a contract enforceable in state court).
77. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (2006) (requiring federal district courts to provide litigants
"with at least one alternative dispute resolution process, including, but not limited to, mediation,
early neutral evaluation, minitrial, and arbitration").
78. It is critical to distinguish between orders that mandate litigants to participate in an ADR
method in the effort to resolve the dispute and orders that effectively require parties to accept or
to be bound by the outcome of the ADR process. In addition, courts might not even be able to
order parties to participate in some forms of non-binding ADR. Compare Strandell v. Jackson
County, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that district court cannot compel litigants to
participate in summary jury trials without their consent), and Kamaunu v. Kaaea, 57 P.3d 428,
431 (Haw. 2002) (holding that trial court could not impose a sanction on a party who failed to
make a settlement offer because of the stated desire to go to trial), with G. Heileman Brewing Co.,
Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming imposition of sanctions
when a party disobeyed a court order requiring the presence at a settlement conference of a
person with settlement authority). But see Heileman, 871 F.2d at 653 ("If this case represented a
situation where [defendant] had sent a corporate representative and was sanctioned because that
person refused to make an offer to pay money-that is, refused to submit to settlement
coercion-we would be faced with a decidedly different issue-a situation we would not
countenance").
79. Compare JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND CORP., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND
EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT, at xxx-xxxv (1996)
(finding little evidence that various ADR methods improved time to disposition, costliness of
litigation, or satisfaction with outcomes), with Fiss, supra note 52, at 1085-87 (discussing the
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argument for using ADR processes rather than litigation procedure
hinges on the parties' consent. That fact does not resolve all issues
regarding ADR; as I have said, exactly how fully informed the parties'

consent to ADR must be remains an open issue. 80 But consent in some
form will typically serve as the justification for a court's decision to
force (or enforce) the parties' movement into ADR.
Conversely, using administrative-agency procedures rather than
litigation procedures must, in most cases, be justified by the gain in
social utility from such procedures. Because statutes require claimants
to enter administrative adjudication, consent is usually inoperative as a

justification for using such procedures. Likewise, unless the procedures
used by an agency in fact make all parties better off, the Paretoimprovement rationale is unavailable. But the final justification-a net
gain in social utility-remains in play. Indeed, the law concerning
administrative procedure reflects exactly this justification. Mathews v.
Eldridge held that, to be consistent with the Due Process Clause, an
agency's decision to terminate benefits without an adversarial hearing is
justified only when the gains to the government from using a nonadversarial process outweighs the expected losses to individuals from
the process: in other words, when any losses in accuracy are offset by
savings from the use of a non-litigation process. 8 1 In more recent years,
the Court has extended the Mathews v. Eldridge approach into contexts
other than the deprivation of government benefits. 82 This expansion

social costs of settlements), and Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging
Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 81 (discussing participants' concerns with mediation
and other litigation alternatives). See also Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants'
Perceptions of Dispute Resolution Procedures:An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical
Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63 (2008) (reporting data from longitudinal study that showed parties'
ex post level of satisfaction with adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory processes tended to correlate
with ex ante preferences for third-party control of the dispute).
80. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing when consent is appropriate).
81. 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976). Mathews v. Eldridge described the three factors that composed
the test for due process as follows:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
Id. at 335. By balancing the product of the first two factors against the third factor, the net social
utility of using non-litigation procedure can be determined. See POSNER, supra note 29, § 21.1
(describing Mathews v. Eldridge as implicitly adopting an economic interpretation of procedure).
82. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2268 (2008) (citing the Mathews v. Eldridge
test to support the "idea that the necessary scope of habeas review in part depends upon the rigor
of any earlier proceedings"); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (using the Mathews
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suggests that the efficiency rationale can serve as a more general
justification by which courts can judge the government's decision to
require individuals to exit into an agency's adjudicatory process.
The correspondence between the Pareto-improvement justification
To begin, massand mass-resolution processes is less evident.
resolution processes typically involve the intermediation of
representatives who act on behalf of individual claimants. In many
cases, mass resolutions are accomplished through the vehicle of the
class action, in which members of the class are represented by the class
representative(s) and class counsel. 83 Comparable mass resolutions
occur in other aggregated or representative processes, including
multidistrict litigation, actions brought by agents or trustees, parens
patriae actions, and actions brought by associations or organizations on
behalf of their members. 84 In such cases, it is common for a lead
counsel, who has significant control over the litigation, to represent the
entire group. 85 Elsewhere I have argued that the duty constitutionally
demanded of class representatives and class counsel requires that they
act in a way that causes no harm to the interests of those they
generally to
represent. 86 The same duty can be ascribed more
87
proceedings.
mass
other
in
counsel
and
representatives

v. Eldridge test to determine the scope of an enemy combatant's opportunity to contest his
detention).
83. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (g) (outlining the role of the class representative and class
counsel).
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006) (describing transfers in multidistrict litigation);
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 cmt. b(1)(B) (Proposed Final Draft
2009) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES] (noting that representative actions other than class actions "may
be numerically more common").
85. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 62, § 10.22 (suggesting the
appointment of lead counsel in appropriate complex cases); PRINCIPLES, supra note 84, § 1.05
cmt. c ("[B]ecause individual participants [in aggregated litigation] are a small part of the total
litigation, a lawyer may have insufficient incentive to see that individual participants are fairly
treated"); id. cmt. f ("[a] lead lawyer in an aggregate proceeding operates without the usual
tethers of loyalty and obedience"); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial
Litigation: Balancing Fairnessand Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
883 (1987) (arguing that the conflicts of interest between attorney and client that arise in mass
litigation are an "agency cost" problem); Jonathon R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'
Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendationsfor Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 22-27 (1991) (arguing that class members'
inability to monitor attorneys and the inefficacy of bonding in class actions create deviations of
interests between attorneys and clients).
86. See Tidmarsh, supra note 26.
87. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 84, § 1.05 cmt. f (stating that, in any aggregate proceeding, a
lawyer should "take all steps that have reasonable potential to make one or more parties or
represented persons better off without harming others"). But see id. cmt. c (suggesting that a duty

20101

Exiting Litigation

Thus, the best justification for exits from litigation into massresolution facilities is that of Pareto improvement for individual
claimants: no harm results to any claimant as a result of using nonlitigation procedures to resolve the dispute and at least one claimant is
made better off. Assuming that the defendants, which are typically
sophisticated institutions and business entities, are unlikely to assent to
exit into a mass-resolution process unless the process is better for them,
then an exit into a mass-resolution process is a Pareto improvement. To
the extent that this assumption is untrue, then the defendants' consent
88
justifies their exit from litigation.
The rough correspondence between the three grounds under which
courts can permit exit into non-litigation processes and the three
common grounds for such exit suggests rules of thumb by which courts
can determine whether exit from litigation is justified. First, courts
should not permit exit into ADR without the consent of the parties.
Second, courts should not permit exit into mass-resolution processes
unless at least one person is made better off and no one is harmed.
Third, courts should not permit exit into administrative adjudication
unless the agency's process results in a net gain in social utility when
compared with the litigation process.
These are, of course, rules of thumb. On certain facts, a justification
other than the most evidently corresponding one might provide the court
with a basis to allow exit. 89 The critical point is that courts should think
much harder than they typically have about the reasons why they allow
exit to occur. Courts typically have not seen themselves as skeptical
gatekeepers in the exit game. All of us, judges included, have become
conditioned to think of exit as a private matter-as something into
which courts have little input other than to grease the hinges leading out
90
of the courthouse door.
of adequate representation might not be constitutionally compelled in aggregated proceedings
other than class actions).
88. When exit into a mass-resolution process harms individual claimants, consent would be a
justification only if each harmed claimant consents to the exit; as I have said, consent cannot be
given by proxies. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (describing individual awards in
negotiated agreements). Nor is the net-social-utility justification available in situations, such as
class-action litigation, in which the Constitution defines adequate representation to require that
the actions of representatives not visit harm on those that they represent. See Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32 (1940) (discussing the scope of the binding effect of a class-action judgment on class
members); Tidmarsh, supra note 26 (discussing the theory of adequate representation in class
actions).
89. See, e.g., supra note 88 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 572 F.3d 854, 862 (11th Cir. 2009) ("Public
policy strongly favors the pretrial settlement of class action lawsuits." (quoting In re U.S. Oil and
Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489, 493 (11th Cir. 1992))); United States v. Glen Falls Newspapers, Inc.,
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But the litigation system is a type of government program, and thus a
public good. 9 1 Like any government institution, courts have an
obligation to ensure that the program they administer works to the
advantage, rather than to the detriment, of its intended beneficiaries.
One point at which they must do so is the point of exit, regardless of
whether exit results from the initiative of claimants or their
representatives or from the dictates of an administrative scheme.
Because exit can occur only with courts' explicit or tacit acquiescence,
courts bear responsibility for justifying their choice to permit exit to
occur.
IV. BEYOND EXIT: THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXIT AND THE LIMITS OF
PROCEDURAL UNIFORMITY

The argument that courts must justify their decisions to permit exit
has two premises: the reality that different dispute-resolution procedures
can affect the outcome of a dispute and the belief that courts ought to
care about the inequity that can result from a putative litigant's entry
into a procedural system that is less favorable than the default
procedural system that the courts provide. The argument and its
premises can also apply beyond exits from litigation. Let me suggest
two further applications. First, courts can (and sometimes do) adopt
different procedures for different types of cases. 9 2 Procedural rules that
apply only to some types of cases are, to use the word common among
proceduralists, "non-transsubstantive." 9 3 One of the challenges in

160 F.3d 853, 858 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting the district court's "Article III function of crafting a
settlement" in a complex case).
91. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA's Impact on Litigation As a Public Good, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2518-19 (2008); Fiss, supra note 52, at 1085.

92. For instance, some courts develop tracks, complete with different case-management and
discovery limitations, for cases of different size and complexity. See, e.g., C.D. ILL. R. 16.1; D.
ME. R. 16.1, 16.3; N.D. W. VA. R. 16.02-.03. Other courts develop specialized rules for
substantive fields such as patent law. See, e.g., S.D. TEX. R. OF PRACTICE FOR PATENT CASES,

availableat http:l/www.txs.uscourts.gov/districtlrulesproc/patentlrules.pdf.
93. Procedural rules are "non-transsubstantive" only when a procedural code uses different
procedures to resolve cases in different substantive fields (say, different rules in tort cases and
antitrust cases). But the word is sometimes used in a looser sense to describe any situation in
which a procedural rule applies only to a subset of cases. But see Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading
and the Dilemmas of "General Rules," 2009 Wis. L. REV. 535, 536 (describing such rules as

"transprocedural").

The classic article describing the aspiration and limits of transsubstantive

procedural rules is Robert M. Cover, ForJames Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of

the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 732-35, 737 (1975). For compilations of literature discussing the
transsubstantive premise of modem federal procedure, see JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H.
TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 6-7 (1998); Thomas 0.
Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of Intra-State
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modern procedural theory is to determine whether and when it is
permissible to use non-uniform-in other words, non-transsubstantive
-procedural rules that can be expected to result in more favorable
94
outcomes for some cases than for others.
95
It is beyond the scope of this essay to explore the issue in detail.
Nonetheless, the question of justifying the use of non-uniform
procedural rules within the litigation system strikes me in many ways as
identical to the question of justifying the use of non-uniform procedural
rules among the litigation system and alternative systems such as ADR,
mass-resolution facilities, and administrative adjudication. 9 6 In both
situations, the judiciary must justify its decisions to permit (or at least to
acquiescence in) the use of different procedures that can be expected to
result in different outcomes for similar disputes. As with the use of
non-litigation procedural
forms, the justification
for nontranssubstantivity must ultimately lie either in a notion of autonomy
(consent) or in some notion of efficiency (whether measured by Pareto
improvements or net gains in social utility).
Second, the principles that I have suggested also seem applicable
when a court is considering whether to allow a litigant to exit from one
form of litigation into another. The situation I have in mind is the
movement from class-action or other aggregated litigation into
individual litigation. The circumstances under which a class member
97
enjoys the right to exit from class litigation are presently contested.

Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46
VILL. L. REV. 311, 318 n.30 (2001).
94. For my earliest attempt to explore the reasons why different, outcome-affecting rules
might be applied in complex cases and ordinary cases, see Tidmarsh, supra note 1.
95. I thank Professor Spencer Waller for pointing out this connection.
96. There are some differences in the two situations, such as the need for courts to respect the
democratic process' decision to require exit from litigation into an administrative process-a
consideration that does not apply in the litigation context unless the non-transsubstantive rules at
issue are legislative in origin. Cf Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat.
4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (changing jurisdictional and settlement rules for
federal class actions); Y2K Act, Pub. L. 106-37, 113 Stat. 185 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
6601-6617 (2006)) (imposing notification and heightened pleading requirements in Y2K liability
lawsuits); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737,
743 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006)) (changing aspects of the federal class-action rule in
federal securities cases). The differences in the two situations, however, suggest to me a
heightened need to justify non-transsubstantive litigation rules.
97. At present, there are two distinct threads to this question. The first is whether (and when)
the Due Process Clause requires class members (or, possibly, others caught up in aggregate
litigation) to be given the right to opt out of the class action. The second is whether class
members that did not opt out of the class action can later repudiate the results of the action by
contending that they were inadequately represented in a collateral suit. Both questions have their
origin in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). Despite opportunities when it
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Often the issue is framed as one of "voice" versus "exit": whether it is
better to keep litigants in the aggregated proceeding but ensure that their
voices are heard and heeded, or to give them the opportunity to exit and
pursue their own interests separately. 9 8 Typically, this discussion
centers on the circumstances in which a class member or other
aggregated litigant should be allowed to exit.
The framework
developed in this essay suggests that the focus ought to lie on the
circumstances in which a class member or other aggregated litigant
should not be allowed to exit from one procedural form (class or
aggregated proceedings) into another (an individual proceeding). 99 The
analysis in this essay suggests that a court should not allow exit from
one litigation form into another unless all affected parties consent to the
exit, exit is better for at least one affected party and worse for none, or
10 0
exit increases net social utility.
These last two conclusions are tentative, and require greater analysis
than I can provide in this essay. The desirable degree of uniformity in
procedural rules and the proper relationship between aggregated and
individual proceedings are significant questions that the judiciary faces
in the twenty-first century-as significant as the question of exit into
non-litigated procedural forms. My suggestion here is that these
seemingly different problems have a common denominator in the set of
reasons that can justify judicial efforts at reform.

might have done so, the Supreme Court has yet to resolve either issue. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 844-48 (1999) (raising the first issue but deciding the case on other
grounds); Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (per curiam) (4-4 decision)
(affirming a judgment that allowed a collateral attack). The issues have generated a number of
lower-court decisions and a vast secondary literature. For a sampling, see ROWE ET AL., supra
note 46, at 682-88; TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 93, at 294-310.
98. The seminal article is John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty in RepresentativeLitigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000).
99. The converse is also true: a court should not require a litigant who has commenced an
individual suit to exit into a class action or aggregated proceeding unless one of the justifications
outlined in this essay exist. The timing of the filing of a class action or aggregation in relation to
the filing of individual suits can therefore matter, at least in situations in which the burden of
proof might decide the permissibility of exit. See supra note 63 and accompanying text
(discussing how courts manage arbitration).
100. Even if exit from a class or other aggregated proceeding is not justified, a court can still
work to improve the litigants' voices within the proceeding.

